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ABSTRACT: This article argues that the normative foundations and political impli-
cations of David Held’s cosmopolitan social democracy are insufficient as solutions
to the moral and social problems he criticizes. The article develops a life-grounded
alternative critique of globalization that roots our ethical duties towards each other
in consciousness of our shared needs and capabilities. These ethical duties are best
realized in political projects aimed at fundamental long-term transformations in the
principles that govern major socio-economic institutions. 
RÉSUMÉ : Cet article soutient que les fondements normatifs et les implications
politiques de la démocratie sociale cosmopolite proposée par David Held n’offrent
pas de solution satisfaisante aux problèmes sociaux et moraux qu’il critique. Notre
article développe une critique alternative de la globalisation, fondée sur l’expérience
de la vie, qui fait de la conscience que nous avons des besoins et des capacités des uns
et des autres la source de nos obligations morales réciproques. Ces obligations
morales s’accomplissent surtout dans des projets politiques qui visent à introduire
des modifications fondamentales et durables dans les principes qui régissent les plus
importantes institutions socio-économiques. 
 
David Held, one of  the most astute critics of  contemporary globalization,
identifies a “moral gap” in life chances between the world’s richest and
poorest inhabitants as the pre-eminent ethical-political problem of our
time. This moral gap is defined by “a world in which . . . over 1.2 billion
people live on less than 1 dollar a day, 46% of the world’s population live
on less than 2 dollars a day, and 20% of the world’s population enjoy over
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80% of its wealth; and, by commitments and values often shaped by ‘pas-
sive indifference’” (Held 2004, p. 91). If  it is true that this moral gap is the
pre-eminent ethical-political problem then it is of  pressing importance for
ethical-political philosophy to understand its causes and structure as well
as to pose strategies by which it might be closed. Here I am interested less
in providing a detailed historical explanation of  the forces of  capitalist glo-
balization as I am in understanding the ethical grounds upon which a gap
in life-chances appears as a specifically ethical-political problem. As for
the practical political dimension of  strategies for social change, I am less
interested in working out the complexities of  an explicitly political
response as I am in understanding what ideas might provide the best moti-
vation for overcoming the “passive indifference” with which the moral gap
is too often treated. 
 I will pursue these twin objectives through a critical examination of  the
ethical and political foundations of  Held’s cosmopolitan alternative to
contemporary globalization. The fundamental principle of  this alterna-
tive is that “the ultimate units of  moral concern are individual human
beings. . . . Human beings belong to a single moral realm in which each
person is equally worthy of  respect and consideration” (Held and Koenig-
Archibugi 2003, p. 169). I will argue that while the (clearly) Kantian roots
of  this idea of  a “moral realm” of  equal autonomous agents provide
grounds for an abstract idea of  a universal human community, there are
good reasons to conclude that it will lack the motivational force necessary
to overcome indifference to the suffering of  others. Hence, a different
foundation is needed for the type of  human community necessary to effi-
caciously confront and close the moral gap that mars the life-chances of
billions in the world. In the first part of  this article I will critically examine
the Kantian grounds of  Held’s position and the ethical-political conclu-
sions that he draws from them. In the second I will develop what I will call,
following John McMurtry, a life-grounded conception of  human commu-
nity as a solution to the problems of  Held’s cosmopolitanism disclosed in
the first part.
 
1. Moral Personhood, Human Rights, and Global Social Democracy
 
In a recent work David Held has produced a powerful critique of  the
Washington Consensus and posited as an alternative the internationaliza-
tion of  the values and institutions of  social democracy (2004, pp. xiv-xv).
Against the one-sided affirmation of  unregulated capital flows and indif-
ference to meeting the unmet vital needs of  the world’s poorest people,
Held champions the regulation of  global markets according to an imper-
ative of  fundamental need satisfaction. The normative foundation of  this
project is a principle of  cosmopolitan egalitarian individualism which
affirms 
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those basic values that set down standards or boundaries which no agent,
whether a representative global body, state, or civil association should be able
to violate. Focussed on the claims of  each person as an individual or as a mem-
ber of  humanity as a whole, these values espouse the idea that human beings
are in a fundamental sense equal, and that they deserve equal political treat-
ment; that is, treatment based on the equal care and consideration of  their
agency. (Held 2004, p. 170)
 
The cosmopolitan order that Held envisages is thus rooted in a system of
human rights that is sensitive both to the basic claims of  fundamental
needs and the higher-level demands for democratic institutions implied by
the moral nature of  persons as agents. The essential philosophical foun-
dations for this position were laid more than two centuries ago by Imman-
uel Kant. 
That which is essential in Kant for understanding the strengths and
limitations of  Held’s theory is less his political speculations about a future
world governed by cosmopolitan law than his conceptions of  moral per-
sonhood and moral community. Kant’s explicit political writings on cos-
mopolitan law are too undeveloped to be of  direct use in the radically
changed socio-historical context of  today (Held and Koenig-Archibugi
2003, p. 168; Kant 1963). The same is not true of  his conception of  per-
sonhood and moral community. Precisely because globalization appears
to emphasize and intensify our differences at the same time as it draws
everyone together into new and shared “communities of  fate,” the con-
temporary era is in more need than ever of  universal ethical standards and
political principles “that nobody, motivated to establish an uncoerced
and informed agreement, could reasonably reject” (Held and Koenig-
Archibugi 2003, p. 169). The question is, however, whether principles that
no one could reasonably reject are sufficient as motivating reasons for
action and foundations for a new institutional order capable of  solving
the key ethical-political problems of  our time. Answering that question
requires that we reflect more fully on the Kantian conception of  persons
at the basis of  Held’s argument. 
According to Kant, human beings unite in themselves two worlds: the
world of  nature (governed by mechanical causes) and the world of  reason
(governed by the “causality of  freedom”) (Kant 1987, pp. 635-44). It is our
rational nature that makes us objects of  moral concern; our embodied real-
ity ties us to the natural kingdom by feelings of  pleasure and sets us at odds
with each other. Kant argues that morality is grounded upon the rule of
reason over the sensuous, embodied, natural self. “Only in such a case does
reason, in as much as it determines the will by itself—not being at the ser-
vice of  the inclinations—occupy the place of  the faculty of  desire, to be
entitled a higher faculty” (Kant 1998, p. 25). In other words, human beings
are moral persons because they are rational and because they are rational
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they are agents capable of  determining ends for themselves. Insofar as all
human beings are understood to be rational agents, they are all equally
capable of  understanding each other’s rational ends. Insofar as they are
capable of  this essential form of mutual understanding they are capable of
respecting each other. To the extent that this moral mutual recognition
actually governs people’s lives, human beings exist within a “realm of
ends.” “By ‘realm’ I understand the ‘systematic union of different rational
beings through common laws’” (Kant 1969, p. 58). As Habermas notes,
Kant’s kingdom of ends has political significance insofar as it enables peo-
ple to think beyond locally constituted differences and recognize others as
moral equals. As he writes, “the normative model for a community without
any possible exclusions is the universe of  moral persons—Kant’s kingdom
of ends” (Habermas 2000, p. 108). Held echoes this interpretation of the
realm of ends insofar as his fundamental cosmopolitan principle, that of
the equal moral worth of  individuals, implies that “humankind belongs to
a single moral realm” (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2003, p. 169). 
The problem, however, as Kant’s ethical philosophy makes clear, is that
human beings inhabit this realm of  ends only insofar as they think of  each
other as autonomous agents. Kant’s conception of  agency is one-sided: it
is focused exclusively on the internal condition of  free will and ignores, as
a consequence, the external, material conditions of  free activity. Since
agency in Kant’s sense does not and cannot free us from our embodiment,
it does not and cannot free us from the permanent possibility of  discord
over conflicting demands grounded in different desires and demands.
Kant’s political solution to this problem is a classically liberal conception
of constitutional law as an agreed-upon framework for the pursuit of  indi-
vidual interest (Kant 1963, p. 17). Of more importance for our purposes
is what Kant does not say about the conditions for realizing the realm of
ends within embodied social life.
Insofar as human beings inhabit the realm of  ends, Kant argues, they
have dignity. Dignity may be defined as the unpriceable moral worth of
human beings. Whatever does not have dignity, according to Kant, has a
price. Since it is only our rational selves that have dignity, it follows that
our body, considered only insofar as it is a natural organism, can have a
price. I do not mean to imply that Kant’s ethical principles permit the buy-
ing and selling of  human beings as slaves. What I do mean to emphasize
is that Kant sees no contradiction to his ethical principles in the pricing
of the goods and resources that human beings need to live insofar as they
are embodied beings. He says so explicitly: “That which is related to gen-
eral human inclinations and needs has a market price” (Kant 1969, p. 60).
Hence, for Kant’s own theorization of  the moral worth of  persons there is
no contradiction between the person as a free end in itself  and the person
as an embodied organism dependent upon market forces for the provision
(at a price, of  course) for the resources that they need to survive. If  no
 Cosmopolitan Globalism
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moral problem arises for the Kantian conception of  the person from the
rule of  market forces over the material conditions of  human life, and that
structure of  rule is the cause of  the “moral gap” in life-chances, it would
appear that Kant’s ethical philosophy is ill-suited as a moral foundation
for a politics designed to close that moral gap. 
Stated in this bald form, however, this conclusion is unsound. The fact
that Kant himself  could not see beyond the social structures of  the nine-
teenth century does not entail that the implications of  his principles do
not transcend those structures (Goldmann 1971, p. 170). Held himself, as
noted above, does not commit himself  to the determinate political conclu-
sions that Kant drew. Instead he joins a long tradition of  thinkers who
have sought to unlock the more radical socio-economic and political
implications of  Kant from the limitations subsequent historical develop-
ments have revealed in Kant’s own interpretation.
 
1
 
 To what extent Held’s
cosmopolitanism succeeds I will now proceed to investigate.
Held’s critique of  the moral gap in life-chances clearly implies that a glo-
bal capitalist economy ungoverned by the ethical principles of  cosmopol-
itanism is incapable of  satisfying fundamental human needs. Thus, a
necessary consequence of  its unregulated operation is the gross violation
of human dignity represented by humanity-destroying absolute poverty.
The fundamental principles of  cosmopolitanism demonstrate the need for
what Held calls a new global covenant. As he explains it, this covenant
would “build on the strengths of  the liberal multilateral order, particularly
its commitment to universal standards, human rights and democratic val-
ues, and which seeks to specify principles on which all could act” (Held
2004, p. 171). The essential principles that form the content of  this new
covenant are the equal worth and dignity of  human beings, active agency,
collective decision-making on matters of  public concern, the avoidance of
serious harms (urgent need satisfaction), and environmental sustainability.
The rule of  market forces over the material conditions of  human life would
be replaced with a regulated market conceived on analogy with national
forms of social democracy that prevailed in the interwar years. Held thus
does not argue that market forces need to be progressively eliminated as
the material condition of the equal realization of full human agency.
Rather, he limits himself  to calling for their “embedding” in the moral val-
ues of  cosmopolitanism (Held 1995, pp. 240-41).
Held does not precisely define or supply a clear criterion of  fundamen-
tal needs. Nor does he supply any criterion by which fundamental needs
could be distinguished from non-fundamental needs or needs as such from
contingent desires or wants. Hence, the material conditions for the real-
ization of  the value of  agency are not clearly spelled out. Nor is the content
of  his understanding of  agency clearly explicated. These particular prob-
lems all follow from his failure to question the deep normative implica-
tions of  the globalized market for the human meaning of  life-projects. His
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express concern is to grasp the external effects market forces have on
access to the most rudimentary material conditions of  life (Held 2004,
p. 155). To be sure, ameliorating the gross inequalities of  the world is an
immediate imperative and to this extent Held’s cosmopolitan social dem-
ocratic alternative to the Washington Consensus is a most necessary cor-
rective. Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons to doubt whether
Held’s cosmopolitan alternative is a sufficient cure for the disease that he
himself  diagnoses. I will treat each in turn.
First is the question of  motivation. The motivating force behind politi-
cal movements is the moral power of  the principle of  equal worth of
human beings and the moral community of  humankind. To some philos-
ophers these ideas might be inspiring but they are not sufficient to moti-
vate transformations of  consciousness amongst those who are “passively
indifferent” to the moral gap in life chances. I am not simply asserting this
point dogmatically. In fact, Held himself  recognizes it. He writes that “the
principle of  egalitarian individualism may be widely recognized, but it
scarcely structures much social and economic policy” (Held and Koenig-
Archibugi 2003, p. 172). Why it fails to do so is a matter of  extreme com-
plexity, empirical and theoretical, that perhaps cannot be fully resolved
here. Nevertheless, I think that one key reason the principle does in fact
fail to motivate is that it lacks any connection to the affective dimension
of human thought and experience of  other human beings. I am not arguing
that ethical principles are only motivating when they connect with some
(dubious) moral sense. What I will argue, however, is that ethical principles
acquire more motivational force the more their normative content is
linked with affective experience (as opposed to abstract thoughts) of  other
people. We need to feel the harms that others suffer in order to overcome
the passive indifference that Held correctly identifies as the primary
impediment to change. Since the idea of  agency is abstract (i.e., discon-
nected from our embodied being) and dependent—not upon direct affec-
tive experience of  others, but upon certain philosophical principles that
people may or may not understand or accept—it does not lead to the sort
of  felt link between one’s own well-being and that of  others, which is nec-
essary to motivate action. 
Held’s recognition of  the lack of  motivating power of  this principle is
echoed by arguably the most important social and political philosopher
of  the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, Jürgen Habermas.
Commenting on Held’s hopes for a global transformation of  the institu-
tions of  political and economic governance, Habermas argues that “even
a world wide consensus on human rights would not serve as the basis for
a strong equivalent of  the civic solidarity that emerged in the context of
the nation state” (Habermas 2000, p. 108). It would not because the nation
state was “able to succeed because [it was] able to articulate economic
security with a shared sense of  belonging to a common cultural heritage”
 Cosmopolitan Globalism
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(2002, p. 58). The deep problem, as I noted above and will elaborate upon
in the next section, is that the idea of  a moral community of  persons uni-
fied by an idea of  human agency is too abstract, too distinct from con-
sciousness of  the lived reality of  concretely human others. But it is just
when we open our consciousness to the lived reality of  concretely human
others that we find in ourselves the motivating force for change.
The second problem is that, even if  a worldwide consensus on human
rights were to be achieved, the human rights actually recognized in the var-
ious charters of  the United Nations are insufficient in themselves to correct
the socio-material causes of  the moral gap. As Gary Teeple masterfully
demonstrates in his recent critique of  human rights, these rights have co-
evolved with the development of  capitalist market forces (2004, pp. 9-20).
That is, they have not developed primarily in the interests of  human beings
as needy, embodied, and potentially self-determining beings, but in the
social interests of  corporate market agents in stable legal systems and
transparent forms of  political power. That is not to say that human rights
are morally or politically otiose or to be dismissed. Nor is it to foreclose
once for all on the possibility of  deriving more radical conclusions from
different interpretations of  human rights, such as those Gewirth derives in
relation to worker’s control of  production (Gewirth 1996, pp. 257-73). It
is to insist, however, that political philosophers who want to push a deeper
critique of  social dynamics on the basis of  human rights consider the
actual historical and socio-economic context of  their emergence, their co-
evolution with classical liberal rights, and thus their historical entwine-
ment with the justification of  private property in universally needed life-
resources. This historical entwinement imposes real limitations insofar as
any inference from human rights to economic democratization can and
will be met with another (equally valid) inference from human rights to the
security of  private property and the free market. The inferences that phi-
losophers draw from the idea of  human rights, in other words, derive from
their pre-existing political commitments. The idea of  human rights cannot
solve the dispute between opposed political positions because each party
arrives at their preferred interpretation of  human rights according to their
respective political positions. Therefore, conflicts over the proper interpre-
tation of  human rights will prove intractable. A more efficacious approach,
then, I will argue, is to proceed from normative premises that are inde-
pendent of  the idea of  human rights.
The third problem is directly connected to the second. Held’s concrete
socio-economic alternative to the rule of  unregulated market forces is glo-
bal social democracy. There is little reason to expect, however, that a glo-
bal social democracy would be more successful than its national form. It
is true that the national form of  social democracy reduced quantitative
inequality. It is equally true that it did not end the problems of  poverty.
Of more central importance is that the welfare state did not advance to
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any significant degree the quality of  people’s life activity (their “agency,”
in Held’s terms). It did not do so because it too left market forces intact.
While it did adjust real income to better meet people’s needs, it did not free
the form and content of  human life activity from the determining power
of  market forces. That is, it did not satisfy the social and material condi-
tions of  free self-determination. Market forces, regulated or unregulated,
not only produce and distribute basic life-resources, they also produce
and distribute available forms of  work, leisure, and time. What this fact
means is that, where market forces control needed goods as well as the
structures in which human activity will be developed, those activities will
always be mere means to the overriding end of  the market, namely,
increased productivity and profitability. As with human rights, pointing
out this limitation does not mean rejecting social democracy 
 
tout court
 
,
but demands that we tease out the deeper principle it implies. That deeper
principle then forms the basis for a more radical global political project.
The deeper principle implied by the welfare state is life-grounded and
states that the economy really exists to satisfy human needs and enable
free activity. It follows from this principle, I will argue, that the major
institutions of  a life-grounded economy must be democratic. 
These then are the core objections that can be levelled against Held’s
cosmopolitanism. Their strength, however, should not be measured by
weaknesses that they expose in Held’s theory but only by the strength of
the alternative that they collectively imply. I will now turn to the task of
explicating the “life-grounded” conception of  a human community as an
alternative to Held’s cosmopolitanism. 
 
2. The Life-Ground of Value and Human Community
 
As I argued in the first section, Held’s cosmopolitanism is a development
of  Kant’s conception of  moral personhood and community. Held does not
explicitly maintain Kant’s dualistic conception of  human being. Indeed,
insofar as he recognizes the way in which claims of  urgent need are moral
claims, he might be thought to reject it. Nevertheless, he does not articu-
late his ethical principles as following from a developed understanding of
the embodied nature of  human beings. Nor does he root his conception
of moral community in an account of  our needs for one another. The pri-
mary difference between the life-grounded conception of  human commu-
nity and Held’s cosmopolitanism is that the life-grounded account
proceeds from an integral understanding of  human nature as synthetically
socially organic. That is, human organic nature is such that human beings
must exist together in definite forms of  social relations because they can
only satisfy their needs collectively. Humans can only satisfy their needs
collectively because need-satisfying resources must be produced through
collective labour. Furthermore, as conscious, potentially self-determining
beings, we have needs that go beyond basic material resources to include
 Cosmopolitan Globalism
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institutional structures in which, through various forms of  social interac-
tion (pedagogical, artistic, political), we are enabled to develop our self-
creative capabilities. Social relations, therefore, may be judged from the
perspective of  the life-ground of  value according to the general principle
of  how well or how poorly actual social relations satisfy our needs and
enable us to develop our capabilities.
As a principle of  ethical consciousness, the life-ground roots our ethical
responsibilities in the actual, objective links that tie us together as embod-
ied life-forms. It argues that the motivation to respond to ethical harm is
a necessary consequence of  opening one’s consciousness to the lived real-
ity of  other human beings. Finally, it derives principles that could guide
social transformation from the objective life-interests that follow from our
social organic nature. I will explicate each of  these points in turn. 
Held recognizes that agency depends upon the satisfaction of  urgent
needs. However, he neither defines needs nor investigates whether the fact
that we are needy entails any necessary relations between human beings
which might be of  profound moral and political significance. The life-
grounded approach, on the contrary, starts from the reality of  life as
essentially needy and therefore outwardly directed, by which I simply
mean that life depends upon maintaining constant connection with
resources external to it without which it will be harmed and eventually die.
The verifiable fact that humans are harmed when they fail to satisfy their
needs is the basis for a criterion according to which needs can be distin-
guished from desires. In McMurtry’s formulation needs may be deter-
mined according to the criterion that “N is a need, if  and only if, and to
the extent that, deprivation of  N always results in a reduction of  organic
capability” (1998, p. 164). As the criterion implies, the end of  need satis-
faction is not simply satiety, but rather the maintenance and development
of  organic capabilities (to sense, to act, to think). Need-satisfaction is thus
the means or material condition of  the development of  organic capabili-
ties. If  need-satisfaction is the means, then capability-development is the
end or the value sought by life-forms satisfying their needs. 
If  McMurtry’s criterion of  needs is sound and the argument linking
need-satisfaction and capability realization is cogent, then it follows that
value for living things is in a real sense encoded in their organic nature.
Life-value is the realized capabilities of  living things that increases with
the range and depth of  the capabilities of  the living thing in question
(McMurtry 2005). If  life-value can be realized if  and only if  needs are sat-
isfied, and needs can be satisfied only through the constant maintenance
of  connection between living things and the resources that they require,
then it follows that the ground of  life-value is precisely the connections
between living things and whatever they need to survive and develop.
Hence, the life-ground of  value may be defined as “the connection of  life
to life’s resources as a felt bond of  being that crosses boundaries of  mem-
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branes, classes, peoples, and even species” (McMurtry 1998, p. 23). The
life-ground encompasses all life as such. However, my interest here is the
conscious form that it assumes in human life. Human beings are capable
of  being conscious not only of  harm to self, but also of  harm to others. In
other words, once consciousness is anchored in the life-ground, it reacts
against harm wherever it happens to occur. As McMurtry argues, 
 
[I]f  people observe or know of  the destruction or brutal reduction of  vital life
ranges where no compensating gain in security of  other life can explain it, they
retreat from it within, as if  there were an acquired structure of  thought which
put them “in common” with the lost life, and the life that remains. This is the
civil commons within, and it is not a spiritual conceit. It is a general fact that
is so self-evident underneath acknowledgement that murderous state and cor-
porate agents will go to any lengths to provide cover ups . . . to keep people from
this civil commons consciousness across boundaries. (1999, pp. 214-15) 
 
That it is not simply a spiritual conceit or a mere postulate of  contingent
philosophizing, we may cite as evidence any movement where people who
have no direct stake in the prevention of  harm to others mobilize to reach
out across time, space, and culture in solidarity with harmed others. The
anti-war movement prior to the invasion of  Iraq was an excellent example.
No one outside of  Iraq or not in the invading militaries was at risk of  suf-
fering diminished quality of  life, and yet millions of  people mobilized
against the war. Its life-grounded foundation was evocatively expressed on
a poster carried by a pregnant demonstrator in New York City on the
worldwide day of  action against the war on February 15, 2003. It read
simply, “Power comes from giving life” (
 
Globe and Mail
 
, Monday, Febru-
ary 17, 2003, p. A6). Any act of  solidarity that links the directly unaffected
to the directly affected manifests the same life-ground. 
This argument invites the objection that if  the life-ground were some-
thing more than a spiritual conceit then it would make impossible the
shocking brutality of  people towards others categorized as essentially dif-
ferent, not to mention the passive indifference that characterizes attitudes
towards the prevailing moral gap in life-chances. Is it not the case that
passive indifference or active brutalization is a more pervasive fact of
human relations than life-grounded care, concern, and solidarity (Cohen
2001; Geras 1998)? Taken as empirical propositions, either would be
extremely difficult to prove. For present purposes, however, it is not essen-
tial to resolve the opposition at an empirical level. What is essential is the
normative point in dispute: the fact of  passive indifference or active bru-
tality seems to demonstrate that the life-ground of  value has no more—
indeed, perhaps less—motivating power than Held’s cosmopolitan prin-
ciples. 
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I do not believe that the objection proves this conclusion. First of  all,
the claim is not that solidarity is mechanical or abstractly “natural” such
that always and everywhere humans spontaneously accord with one
another. Second, the life-grounded argument expressly maintains that
people must open their consciousness—that is, pay attention to—others
as needy and capable human beings. If  they do not, if  they judge others
on the basis of  various ideologies of  difference, then they in fact can be
indifferent or brutal. What allows us, however, to judge indifference or
brutality as morally wrong if  not the (at least implicit) recognition that
such an attitude leaves persons to suffer under conditions that we know
are harmful to them? If  we in fact make ourselves conscious of  the other
as an embodied human being identical to ourselves in that foundational
respect, then their suffering does become intolerable and we are motivated
to do something about it. In other words, our cognitive recognition of  the
causes of  harm is conjoined to an affective experience of  another human
suffering harm. We know and feel the harm they suffer because of  the life-
grounded identity we share as living human beings. This unity of  under-
standing and shared feeling is always present, I contend, where concrete
action is taken against the known social causes of  harm. Where they are
not present together people prove liable either to abstract rationalizations
that explain away the need for transformative action, or xenophobic indif-
ference to (or active hatred of), the suffering of  others. It takes philosoph-
ical work to produce life-grounded unity of  understanding and shared
feeling, but once it has been created, solidarity and practical action
against the causes of  harm develop. 
Does a focus on their agency in Held’s Kantian sense of  the term nec-
essarily lead to a similar inability to tolerate the harms suffered by others?
I do not believe that it does. If  one interprets agency as a moral fact about
human beings, i.e., an essential feature of  humans that simply cannot be
damaged by material conditions, then one could just as easily argue that
no one ought to intervene to help others in need precisely because such
intervention would violate their agency. This sort of  argument is exactly
the type used by libertarians such as Nozick who, on strictly Kantian
grounds, conclude that any interference with market forces violates the
Kantian principle that human beings are ends in themselves (Nozick 1974
pp. 30-31). I am not arguing that Kantianism properly construed leads to
libertarian indifference to the harms caused by unregulated market forces.
Nozick is no philosophical slouch, however, and the cogency of  his argu-
ment proves at least that Kantianism is compatible with an interpretation
radically at odds with Held’s interpretation. In order to obviate the force
of  this objection Held would have to appeal to the reality of  urgent need
as a basis of  moral concern for others. That position points us precisely
in the direction of  the life-ground. 
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Once ethical principles have become anchored in the life-ground, such
that the primary object of  moral concern is the whole embodied being as
a needy and capable life-form that essentially depends upon the principles
governing social relations for its life and well-being, it becomes impossi-
ble to generate moral defences of  passive indifference to radical need-
deprivation simply because it happens far from home. The life-grounded
approach solves the problem of  whether our duties toward those in our
own region or nation are stronger than toward those in other regions or
nations. From the life-grounded perspective duties do not derive from
particular and accidental identities such as shared nationality but from
our common needs and capabilities. Duties in any particular case may be
discovered by considering them as a function of  the relation between the
intensity of  the need and one’s concrete ability to help. In general, our
strongest duties are towards those most in need, proportional to our abil-
ity to help. Thus it may turn out that what we owe to those distant others
most in need is not direct contributions to the immediate satisfaction of
basic needs (because we can do little in this regard), but to join in longer-
term struggles to change the social dynamics that can be demonstrated to
cause radical-need deprivation. In each case, however, practical reasoning
and argument will be required for conscientious decision-making. 
It is on this basis of  life-grounded consciousness of  human intercon-
nection that it becomes possible to conceive of  a different sort of  universal
community. This community is neither a community purely “in mind,” as
the Kantian moral community is, but nor are its implications fully real-
ized at present. Rather, the human community understood from a life-
grounded perspective is best understood at present as what Keith Graham
calls a “potential collectivity,” by which he means “some group of  people
sharing some common condition and common interests and having the
power to act collectively so as to further those interests, even if  in fact they
do not” (Graham 2002, p. 77). Our shared social-organic nature gives us
a shared set of  needs and capabilities. Since we suffer harm if  we are
deprived of  that which we need because it reduces or destroys our capa-
bilities, we also have an equal, shared life-interest (even if  we do not
always act on that interest) in need satisfaction. From this shared interest
in need satisfaction we can derive a principle, adherence to which would
constitute grounds for membership in the human community. The human
community is progressively realized as people adopt the principle of  mem-
bership.
 The principle of  membership in this human community could be stated
as follows: one acts as a member of  the human community when one
responds to the unmet needs of  others in such a way as (a) to satisfy those
needs directly, when one is in a position to do so, or, more importantly
from the political standpoint, (b) to work against identifiable social causes
of  harm and therefore to contribute indirectly to need satisfaction to the
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need-deprived wherever they happen to be. Since the object of  conscious-
ness in the case of  action is the humanity of  the other person as an equally
needy and capable being, then when I act in accordance with the principle
I act in such a way that my act can only be understood by reference to my
membership in the human community. As Graham argues, “practical
identification with a collectivity consists in my associating myself  with its
decisions and actions, on appropriate occasions attempting to think and
act as if  for the collectivity itself, and taking its good as my own” (Graham
2002, p. 112). Thus the human community becomes real as a political
agent when human beings direct their thought and action to identifying
the social causes of  harm and working to eliminate them. Because I act as
a human and direct my activity towards the humanity of  the other I
expand my self-identity to embrace the well-being of  the other. If  “com-
munity” means that self-identity is expanded to comprehend the good of
other members then this form of  activity is rightly called acting as a mem-
ber of  the human community. This political agent could, in principle,
embrace the totality of  the human race but is not negated by the fact that
not everyone acts all the time as a member of  it, or by the fact that differ-
ences of  social interest impede some empirical human beings from recog-
nizing the humanity of  others or of  actively harming them. By the
definition given above, those who serve demonstrably harmful social insti-
tutions or practice are acting “inhumanly.” 
It remains finally to justify the critique of  Held’s political solution to
the harms caused by capitalist globalization, global social democracy, by
examining the political implications of  the life-grounded conception of
human community. Recall that the key limitation was that Held’s global
social democracy is based upon the structures of  the national form of
social democracy which, while it led to a quantitative reduction in mate-
rial inequality did not lead to a corresponding improvement in the quality
of  life-activity as measured by the range and depth of  capability realiza-
tion. It did not do so because it sought to regulate market forces but not
to supplant them by democratic steering of  major economic institutions.
I also noted, however, that to stress the limitations of  social democratic
forms of  regulation is not the same thing as to reject them outright. 
Thus the key question to answer at this point is: if  not social democratic
regulation of  market forces or laissez-faire globalization of  market forces,
then what? The only concrete alternative to both was the command econ-
omies of  Stalinist societies, and those proved to be inefficient and main-
tained by totalitarian rule. Clearly it is neither reasonable nor morally
legitimate to argue for a return to Stalinist authoritarianism. Thus it
appears that my argument reaches a practical dead end. It may be the case
that social democracy faces intrinsic limitations when judged from a life-
grounded perspective, but if  there is no actual alternative to it then I can
serve up irresponsible and empty utopian principles at best.
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That conclusion is not warranted, however. If  we examine the long-term
tendency of  the development of  liberal capitalist societies we can see that
it is characterized by growing political and social intervention in the eco-
nomic dynamics of  capitalist markets. The further development of  this
tendency has been checked by the emergence of  a more intensified form of
globalization in the early 1970s. However, judged over the long term
(roughly, the seventeenth to the late twentieth centuries), it is this retrench-
ment of  private economic power and not economic democratization that
is the aberration. What this means in the present context is that social
democratization of  the global economy should be interpreted as a plateau
and not the summit of  the social transformations necessary to close the
moral gap and satisfy the equal life-interests in the material conditions of
human freedom. An evolutionary movement towards an ever more dem-
ocratic economy steered by negotiations between different social groups
could deal with the problems of  complexity and information that
destroyed the Stalinist command economy. The key to success is gradual
and evolutionary transformation, building on actual democratic elements
already operative but suppressed by the overriding imperative of  profit-
maximization.
 
2
 
It is the life-ground of  value that provides the systematic link between
these forms of  political action, the motivation to undertake them, and the
moral principles that guide and justify them. Once human beings become
conscious of  other human beings as embodied, needy, and capable, they
become conscious of  an essential identity that links them at the level of
life-activity and its material and social conditions. Once this identity
becomes the principle that orients consciousness in its affective and cog-
nitive dimensions, we become alive to the reality of  the harms that global
market society imposes upon others. The unity of  understanding and feel-
ing that is definitive of  consciousness of  the life-ground of  value motivates
action towards the creation of  a human community, i.e., an evolving and
active movement towards a new world whose governing social principles
would prioritize the satisfaction of  the full range of  human needs for the
sake of  the maximally rich development of  human capabilities.
 
Notes
 
1 The best of  those efforts is, I believe, Harry van der Linden’s 
 
Kantian Ethics and
Socialism
 
 (1988). In addition to being brilliantly argued, it also contains a com-
prehensive analysis of  the work of  late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
Kantian socialists such as Hermann Cohen whose work is little read in the
English-speaking world. Alan Gewirth also develops socialistic conclusions
about the need for economic democracy from the implications of  his Principle
of  Generic Consistency (which, as a principle, owes much to the Kantian tradi-
tion). See his 
 
The Community of Rights
 
 (1996, pp. 19 and esp. pp. 257-301). How
far these efforts go toward freeing the implications of  Kant’s ethical philosophy
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from the limitations that Kant himself  assigned to it cannot be satisfactorily
determined here. I would argue, however, that to the extent that efforts from
those such as van der Linden and Gewirth demonstrate the necessity of  funda-
mentally transforming socio-economic life, they will be forced to take much
more seriously (in an ethical sense) the fact of  human embodiment than does
Kant. Allegiance to a socialist version of  Kant’s principle that human beings are
of intrinsic worth would also require fundamental revisions to how Kant
intended readers to interpret that principle. It becomes questionable, to my
mind, to what extent such positions really are Kantian in anything more than
inspiration and general approach. 
2 Pat Devine (1988) has demonstrated in elaborate detail how an economy
steered by democratic negotiation can answer all the essential objections lev-
elled against theories of  democratic economies by classical and neoclassical
economics. Readers interested in the details should examine his major work. 
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